Explainer
The Boeing 737 MAX: crashes, grounding, fixes and production caps
Two 737 MAX 8 crashes, Lion Air 610 in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 in March 2019, killed 346 people, and the FAA grounded the type on 13 March 2019.[1][2][3] The FAA identified the unsafe condition as the potential for a single erroneous angle-of-attack sensor input to cause repeated nose-down trim, and required software, wiring, procedure and training changes before general operations resumed in November 2020.[4][5][6][3] After a door plug blew out of a 737-9 MAX in January 2024, the FAA capped 737 production; Boeing says it reached 42 a month in late 2025 and began moving to 47 in 2026 with FAA agreement.[7][8][9]
This explainer draws on FAA airworthiness directives and statements, NTSB reports and Boeing’s SEC filings. The 2018 and 2019 crashes were investigated by the Indonesian and Ethiopian authorities; their final reports are not summarised here. Production figures are Boeing’s own.
Two crashes in five months
The FAA approved the 737-8 (MAX 8) in 2017 through an amended type certificate.[10] On 29 October 2018 Lion Air flight 610, a 737 MAX 8, crashed into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 people aboard.[1] On 10 March 2019 Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, also a MAX 8, crashed near Ejere shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 aboard.[2] Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee and Ethiopia’s Accident Investigation Bureau led the investigations, with the NTSB taking part under ICAO Annex 13 as the authority for the state of design and manufacture.[1][2][11]
The NTSB reported that Lion Air 610’s flight data recorder showed the left angle-of-attack sensor reading about 20 degrees higher than the right for the whole flight. Automatic nose-down stabilizer trim inputs occurred more than 20 times over six minutes; the crew countered each one, but the last few were not fully countered.[12]
On 13 March 2019, citing the relationship between the two accidents, the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition that generally barred 737 MAX operations.[3]
What MCAS was and what went wrong
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) improves the 737 MAX’s handling in non-normal flight conditions at high angles of attack, a range the airplane should never reach in normal flight, according to the FAA.[13] Angle of attack is the angle between the wing’s chord line and the oncoming air, explained in how airplanes fly.[14] The FAA identified the unsafe condition as the potential for a single erroneously high angle-of-attack sensor input to cause repeated nose-down trim of the horizontal stabilizer.[4]
In September 2019 the NTSB said the accident pilots’ responses to the unintended MCAS activation were not consistent with the assumptions about pilot recognition and response that Boeing had used, based on FAA guidance, in its safety assessment. It said the evaluation process needed improvement because it was still being used to certify new designs, and issued recommendations to the FAA.[15] How those certification rules work is covered in how aircraft are certified.
The fixes required for return to service
FAA airworthiness directive 2020-24-02 took effect on 20 November 2020. It required new flight control computer software, revised flight manual procedures, new display software, rerouted stabilizer trim wiring, an angle-of-attack sensor system test and an operational readiness flight.[5] With the directive in place, the FAA said the emergency order was no longer necessary.[3]
- Two sensors, not one. The revised MCAS compares two angle-of-attack inputs. If they differ by more than 5.5 degrees for a set period, MCAS is disabled for the rest of the flight, the crew is alerted and maintenance is required.[16]
- One activation per event. The new MCAS activates only once for each high-angle-of-attack event, and only with the flaps fully retracted.[17]
- A disagree alert. New display software implements an AOA DISAGREE alert for certain sensor failures.[18]
- Training. The FAA and other aviation authorities concluded that airline pilots flying the MAX need special training on it, including full-flight-simulator sessions.[6]
Congress later passed the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act in December 2020; the FAA says information from the MAX accidents and investigations was pertinent to its requirements.[19] According to Boeing’s annual report, in May 2025 Boeing and the US Department of Justice entered a non-prosecution agreement over obligations relating to the two accidents, including a $244 million fine and $445 million of additional compensation for victims’ families.[20]
The 2024 door-plug blowout and production limits
On 5 January 2024 a mid-cabin door plug blew out of Alaska Airlines flight 1282, a new 737-9 MAX, in flight, and the FAA grounded 171 737-9 MAX airplanes.[21] That month it halted expansion of 737 MAX production.[7] In March 2024 the FAA said its audit had found multiple instances where Boeing and its supplier Spirit AeroSystems allegedly failed to comply with manufacturing quality-control requirements.[22] The NTSB later found the probable cause was Boeing’s failure to provide adequate training, guidance and oversight to its factory workers, and that the FAA had been ineffective in ensuring Boeing fixed repeated problems with its parts-removal process.[23]
In June 2025 the FAA said it would not lift the monthly production cap until it was confident Boeing could maintain safety and quality while making more aircraft.[24] Boeing says output rose from below 38 a month at the start of 2025 to 42 in the fourth quarter, after the FAA agreed in October 2025 that its performance indicators supported that rate.[8] It says the program began moving to 47 a month in the second quarter of 2026 with FAA concurrence and now expects to stabilise there in 2027.[9]
The MAX 7 and MAX 10
Boeing says the 737-7 received amended FAA type certification in the third quarter of 2026.[25] On 20 October 2026 the FAA certified the 737 MAX 10, issuing an amended type certificate and production approval after requiring flight-control updates including an enhanced angle-of-attack sensor.[26] Boeing’s wider business is covered on the Boeing page.
Read next
Next in the crash course
How air crash investigations work: the NTSB and ICAO Annex 13
How US air accident investigations run: what counts as an accident, the NTSB's party system, probable cause, recorders, and Annex 13 for crashes abroad.
Questions readers ask
Why was the 737 MAX grounded?
After Lion Air flight 610 crashed in October 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed in March 2019, the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition on 13 March 2019, citing the relationship between the two accidents. All 189 and 157 people aboard the two flights died.[1][2][3]
What is MCAS?
The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. The FAA says it improves the 737 MAX's handling at high angles of attack in non-normal flight conditions. Its original design could be triggered by a single erroneously high angle-of-attack sensor reading, causing repeated nose-down trim.[13][4]
What was changed before the 737 MAX flew again?
The FAA's directive, effective 20 November 2020, required new flight control computer software, revised procedures, new display software, rerouted trim wiring, a sensor test and a readiness flight. The new MCAS compares two sensors, activates only once per event and is disabled if the sensors disagree. Pilots also need special training including full-flight-simulator sessions.[5][16][17][6]
What happened on Alaska Airlines flight 1282?
A mid-cabin door plug blew out of the new 737-9 MAX in flight on 5 January 2024, and the FAA grounded 171 737-9 MAX airplanes. The NTSB found the probable cause was Boeing's failure to provide adequate training, guidance and oversight to its factory workers.[21][23]
Sources
· 26 claims from 4 publishers
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.
- [1]
On 29 October 2018 Lion Air flight 610, a 737 MAX 8, crashed into the Java Sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 people aboard; Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee led the investigation. confirmedas of 2019-09-19
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [2]
On 10 March 2019 Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, a 737 MAX 8, crashed near Ejere, Ethiopia, shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing all 157 people aboard; Ethiopia's Accident Investigation Bureau led the investigation. confirmedas of 2019-09-19
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [3]
Citing the relationship between the two accidents, the FAA issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition on 13 March 2019 that generally barred operation of 737 MAX airplanes; the November 2020 airworthiness directive made the order unnecessary so that general operations could resume. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [4]
The FAA's 2020 airworthiness directive identified the unsafe condition as the potential for a single erroneously high angle-of-attack sensor input to cause repeated nose-down trim of the horizontal stabilizer. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [5]
Airworthiness directive 2020-24-02, effective 20 November 2020, required new flight control computer software, revised flight manual procedures, new display software, rerouted stabilizer trim wiring, an angle-of-attack sensor test and an operational readiness flight. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [6]
The FAA and other civil aviation authorities concluded that airline pilots flying the 737 MAX need special training on it, including ground and full-flight-simulator training. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [7]
In January 2024 the FAA halted production expansion of the Boeing 737 MAX. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [8]
Boeing says 737 production recovered from below 38 aircraft a month at the start of 2025 to 42 a month in the fourth quarter, after the FAA and Boeing agreed in October 2025 that the company's performance indicators supported an increase to 42. confirmedas of 2026-01-30
- The Boeing Company Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-01-30 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- The Boeing Company Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-01-30 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [9]
Boeing says its 737 program began moving from 42 to 47 airplanes a month in the second quarter of 2026 with the FAA's concurrence, and it now expects to stabilise at 47 a month in 2027. confirmedas of 2026-10-27· forecast
- The Boeing Company Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-10-27 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- The Boeing Company Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2026 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-10-27 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [10]
The FAA approved the amended type certificate for the Boeing 737-8 (737 MAX 8) in 2017. confirmedas of 2024-01-25
- Disclosure of Safety Critical Information (proposed rule) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2024-01-25 · II.C Factual Background (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [11]
The NTSB took part in both MAX investigations under ICAO Annex 13 as the accident investigation authority for the state of design and manufacture. confirmedas of 2019-09-19
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [12]
The NTSB reported that Lion Air 610's flight data recorder showed the left angle-of-attack sensor reading about 20 degrees higher than the right throughout the flight, and that automatic nose-down stabilizer trim inputs occurred more than 20 times over six minutes; the crew countered each input, but the last few were not fully countered. confirmedas of 2019-09-19
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (the degree sign does not extract from the PDF) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Factual Information, Accidents (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [13]
According to the FAA, MCAS improves the 737 MAX's handling qualities in non-normal flight conditions at high angles of attack, a range the airplane should never reach in normal flight. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [14]
The angle of attack is the acute angle between the chord line of the airfoil and the direction of the relative wind. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25C), Chapter 5: Aerodynamics of Flight · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source · p. 5-2 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [15]
In September 2019 the NTSB said the accident pilots' responses to unintended MCAS operation were not consistent with the assumptions about pilot recognition and response that Boeing used, based on FAA guidance, in its safety assessment; it said the evaluation process needed improvement because it was still used to certify new designs, and issued recommendations to the FAA on how such safety assessments account for pilot responses. confirmedas of 2019-09-19
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (ASR-19-01) · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2019-09-19 · Recommendations, To the Federal Aviation Administration (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [16]
The revised MCAS compares two angle-of-attack inputs and is disabled for the rest of the flight if they differ by more than 5.5 degrees for a set period, with an alert to the crew and maintenance required before the next flight. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [17]
The revised MCAS activates only once for each high-angle-of-attack event and works only with the flaps fully retracted. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [18]
The directive also implemented an AOA DISAGREE alert, through display software, to flag certain angle-of-attack sensor failures. confirmedas of 2020-11-20
- Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes (AD 2020-24-02, 737-8 and 737-9) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2020-11-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [19]
Congress passed the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act on 21 December 2020 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021; the FAA says information from the 737 MAX accidents and the investigations that followed was pertinent to its requirements. confirmedas of 2024-01-25
- Disclosure of Safety Critical Information (proposed rule) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2024-01-25 · II.A Congressional Mandate (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Disclosure of Safety Critical Information (proposed rule) · Federal Register (National Archives) · Primary source · 2024-01-25 · II.C Factual Background (Boeing 737 MAX Accidents and Ensuing Investigations) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [20]
On 29 May 2025 Boeing and the US Department of Justice entered a non-prosecution agreement resolving the department's determination that Boeing had not met its obligations under a January 2021 deferred prosecution agreement relating to the 2018 Lion Air and 2019 Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX accidents; it requires a $244 million fine and $445 million of additional compensation for the victims' families. confirmedas of 2026-01-30
- The Boeing Company Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-01-30 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- The Boeing Company Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-01-30 · Note 23: fine of $ 244 and $ 445 of additional compensation (millions) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [21]
After a mid-cabin door plug blew out of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, a new Boeing 737-9 MAX, in flight on 5 January 2024, the FAA grounded 171 Boeing 737-9 MAX airplanes. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [22]
The FAA said in March 2024 that its six-week audit of Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems found multiple instances where the companies allegedly failed to comply with manufacturing quality-control requirements. confirmedas of 2024-03-04
- Updates on Boeing 737-9 MAX Aircraft · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [23]
On 24 June 2025 the NTSB said the probable cause of the Alaska Airlines 1282 door-plug blowout was Boeing's failure to provide adequate training, guidance and oversight to its factory workers, and found the FAA had been ineffective in ensuring Boeing addressed repetitive and systemic nonconformance issues with its parts-removal process. confirmedas of 2025-06-24
- Boeing's Inadequate 'Training, Guidance and Oversight' Led to Mid-Exit Door Plug Blowout on Passenger Jet · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2025-06-24 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Boeing's Inadequate 'Training, Guidance and Oversight' Led to Mid-Exit Door Plug Blowout on Passenger Jet · National Transportation Safety Board · Primary source · 2025-06-24 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [24]
In June 2025 the FAA said it would not lift the 737 monthly production cap until it was confident Boeing could maintain safety and quality while making more aircraft. confirmedas of 2025-06-24
- General Statements · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [25]
The 737-7 received amended type certification from the FAA in the third quarter of 2026 and the 737-10 in October 2026; Boeing says the 777X remains on track for first delivery in 2027. confirmedas of 2026-10-27
- Boeing Reports Third Quarter Results (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-10-27 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Boeing Reports Third Quarter Results (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1) · Boeing (SEC filing) · Primary source · 2026-10-27 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [26]
On October 20, 2026 the FAA certified the Boeing 737 MAX-10, issuing an amended type certificate and production approval, after requiring flight-control updates including an enhanced angle-of-attack sensor. confirmedas of 2026-10-20
- Federal Aviation Administration Issues Certification for Boeing 737 MAX-10 · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source · 2026-10-20 · Body (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Federal Aviation Administration Issues Certification for Boeing 737 MAX-10 · Federal Aviation Administration · Primary source · 2026-10-20 · Body (retrieved 2026-11-07)
Revision history (1)
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Created Nov 7, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 8, 2026. Next scheduled review: Feb 15, 2027.
Cite this page
"The Boeing 737 MAX: crashes, grounding, fixes and production caps." ContentLora, updated Nov 7, 2026. https://contentlora.com/explain/boeing-737-max-explained
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