Explainer
The Fourth Amendment and phone, location and geofence data
The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures and requires warrants based on probable cause that particularly describe what is to be searched.[1] The Supreme Court has extended it to digital data in steps: police generally need a warrant to search an arrested person's phone (Riley, 2014) and to obtain historical cell-site location records (Carpenter, 2018).[2][3] On 29 June 2026, in Chatrie v. United States, the Court held that obtaining a person's location data from Google through a geofence warrant was a search, and sent the case back to decide whether that warrant was valid.[4][5]
This explainer describes Supreme Court and federal appeals court rulings in their own words. It is general information, not legal advice, and it does not take a side on how police should use digital evidence. The Chatrie case is back in the lower courts, so check for later rulings. Checked at 2026-11-07 (UTC).
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”. It says no warrant shall issue except on probable cause, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.[1]
From places to privacy
In 1967 the Supreme Court said the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places”. It also said that what you knowingly show the public is not protected.[6] A later rule, called the third-party doctrine, says you generally lose that protection for information you hand over to someone else, such as a phone company.[7]
Katz v. United States (1967) held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected.[6] Smith v. Maryland (1979) restated the third-party doctrine: a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties.[7] In United States v. Jones (2012), the Court held that attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicle and using it to monitor the vehicle’s movements was a search.[8]
Phones: Riley and Carpenter
In Riley v. California (2014), the Court held that police generally may not search the digital contents of a phone seized from an arrested person without a warrant. Its answer to what police must do first was simple: get a warrant.[2]
Carpenter v. United States (2018) turned to location records held by phone companies. The Court held that the government’s acquisition of historical cell-site records was a search, and that it must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause first. It declined to extend the third-party doctrine to these records.[3] The Court called its decision narrow. It expressed no view on real-time location data or “tower dumps”, which collect data on every device that connected to a cell site in a period, and it did not call into question conventional tools such as security cameras.[9]
Geofence warrants in the appeals courts
With a geofence warrant, investigators who know where and when a crime happened, but have no suspect, draw a virtual perimeter around the scene and compel a company to hand over data on the phones inside it.[10]
Two federal appeals courts reached different conclusions about them:
- In United States v. Smith (August 2024), the Fifth Circuit held that geofence warrants are general warrants categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. It still upheld the evidence in that case under the good-faith exception.[11]
- In the Chatrie case, a divided Fourth Circuit panel held that no search occurred at all. The full Fourth Circuit then affirmed in a one-sentence order while dividing evenly on whether there had been a search.[12]
Chatrie v. United States (2026)
The Supreme Court granted review on 16 January 2026, limited to whether executing the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.[13] It decided the case on 29 June 2026, holding that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they obtained the defendant’s location data from Google, because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information.[4]
The Court reasoned that Google’s Location History was more precise than the cell-site records in Carpenter, placing a phone within about 20 meters and recording its location about every two minutes.[14] It rejected the government’s reliance on the third-party doctrine, because Carpenter had refused to apply that doctrine to cell-site data and there was no good reason to treat Location History differently. It also rejected the argument that collecting only a short window of location data is not a search.[15] Justice Kagan wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment. Justice Alito dissented, joined in part by Justices Thomas and Barrett, and Justice Barrett also wrote her own dissent.[16]
Finding a search did not end the case. The Fourth Amendment forbids only unreasonable searches, so the Court sent the case back for the Fourth Circuit to decide whether each step of the multi-step warrant met the particularity and probable-cause requirements.[5]
Statutory privacy rules for companies, as opposed to the government, are covered in data privacy laws explained. For free speech, see the First Amendment explained.
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The Supreme Court's October Term 2026, from its own dockets: cases argued and scheduled through January 2027, new grants, emergency orders and opinions so far.
Questions readers ask
Do police need a warrant to search my phone?
Generally yes, if they have seized it during an arrest. In Riley v. California (2014), the Supreme Court held that police generally may not search the digital contents of an arrested person's phone without a warrant.[2]
Can police get my phone's location history from my carrier without a warrant?
For historical cell-site records, Carpenter v. United States (2018) held that getting them is a search and the government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause first. The Court called that ruling narrow and did not decide real-time tracking or tower dumps.[3][9]
What is a geofence warrant?
A warrant that lets investigators draw a virtual perimeter around a crime scene and compel a company to hand over data on the phones that were inside it around the time of the crime.[10]
What did the Supreme Court decide in Chatrie?
That police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they obtained Location History data from Google, because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone location. It did not decide whether the warrant was valid; it sent that question back to the Fourth Circuit.[4][5]
What is the third-party doctrine?
The rule, from cases such as Smith v. Maryland (1979), that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. Carpenter declined to extend it to cell-site records, and Chatrie declined to apply it to Location History.[7][3][15]
Sources
· 16 claims from 4 publishers
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.
- [1]
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers and effects, and requires warrants to rest on probable cause and particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- The Bill of Rights: A Transcription · US National Archives · Primary source · Amendment IV (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- The Bill of Rights: A Transcription · US National Archives · Primary source · Amendment IV (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [2]
In Riley v. California (2014), the Court held that police generally may not search the digital contents of an arrested person's cell phone without a warrant. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2014-06-25 · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2014-06-25 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2014-06-25 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [3]
In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Court held that the government's acquisition of historical cell-site location records was a search and that it must generally get a warrant supported by probable cause first, declining to extend the third-party doctrine to these records. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 · Syllabus, Held 1 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [4]
Decided on 29 June 2026, Chatrie v. United States held that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they obtained a person's location data from Google, because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell-phone location information. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus, Held (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [5]
Chatrie did not decide whether the search was reasonable; it sent the case back for the Fourth Circuit to decide whether each step of the multi-step warrant met the particularity and probable-cause requirements. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (b) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [6]
In Katz v. United States (1967), the Court said the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 1967-12-18 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 1967-12-18 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [7]
Under the third-party doctrine, set out in cases including Smith v. Maryland (1979), a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 1979-06-20 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [8]
In United States v. Jones (2012), the Court held that attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicle and using it to monitor the vehicle's movements is a Fourth Amendment search. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2012-01-23 · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [9]
The Carpenter Court called its decision narrow and expressed no view on real-time location data or "tower dumps", nor did it call into question conventional tools such as security cameras. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · 2018-06-22 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [10]
A geofence warrant lets investigators who know where and when a crime happened, but have no suspect, draw a virtual perimeter around the scene and compel a company to hand over data on the phones inside it at the time. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Opinion of the Court, Part I (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Opinion of the Court, Part I (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [11]
In United States v. Smith (August 2024), the Fifth Circuit held that geofence warrants are modern-day general warrants, categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, though it upheld the evidence in that case under the good-faith exception. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- United States v. Smith, No. 23-60321 (5th Cir. 2024) · US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Primary source · 2024-08-09 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- United States v. Smith, No. 23-60321 (5th Cir. 2024) · US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Primary source · 2024-08-09 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [12]
In the Chatrie case, a divided Fourth Circuit panel held that no search occurred, and the full Fourth Circuit then affirmed in a one-sentence order while dividing evenly on whether there had been a search. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [13]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chatrie v. United States on 16 January 2026, limited to whether executing the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112: Question presented · Supreme Court of the United States · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112: Question presented · Supreme Court of the United States · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [14]
The Chatrie Court found Google's Location History more precise than the cell-site records in Carpenter, pinpointing location to around 20 meters and recording it about every two minutes. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (a)(2) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (a)(2) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [15]
Chatrie rejected the government's third-party-doctrine argument, reasoning that Carpenter refused to apply that doctrine to cell-site data and no good reason existed to treat Location History differently, and rejected the idea that short periods of location data fall outside the Fourth Amendment. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (a)(4) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (a)(3) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [16]
Justice Kagan wrote the Chatrie opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Jackson; Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment; Justice Alito dissented, joined in part by Justices Thomas and Barrett, and Justice Barrett also wrote a separate dissent. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) · Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (opinion text) · Primary source · Syllabus (retrieved 2026-11-07)
Revision history (1)
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Created Nov 7, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 8, 2026. Next scheduled review: Feb 7, 2027.
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"The Fourth Amendment and phone, location and geofence data." ContentLora, updated Nov 7, 2026. https://contentlora.com/explain/fourth-amendment-and-digital-privacy
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