Concluded story
The 2025 F5 source code breach and CISA Emergency Directive 26-01
F5 told the SEC on October 15, 2025 that a nation-state threat actor had held long-term access to some of its systems and had taken files containing portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities.[1][2][3] The same day CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-01, calling the actor an imminent threat to federal networks that use F5 devices.[4][5] It ordered federal civilian agencies to update listed F5 products by October 22, 2025 and to report to CISA by October 29.[6]
What we know
- F5 learned on August 9, 2025 that a nation-state threat actor had accessed some of its systems[1]
- Stolen files included portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities[3]
- F5 said it had no evidence its software supply chain or build pipelines were modified[9]
- The Justice Department allowed F5 to delay public disclosure[13]
- CISA ordered federal civilian agencies to update F5 products by October 22, 2025[6]
What we don't know yet
- Which country the attacker is linked to; F5 and CISA described a nation-state actor without naming one
- Whether the stolen information has since been used to attack F5 customers
- The final financial impact on F5
What F5 disclosed
In a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2025, the company said it learned on August 9, 2025 that a highly sophisticated nation-state threat actor had gained unauthorized access to certain company systems.[1] It said the attacker had held long-term, persistent access to systems including its BIG-IP product development environment and engineering knowledge management platform.[2]
F5 said files taken included portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities it was working on in BIG-IP.[3] Some files from the knowledge management platform contained configuration or implementation information for a small percentage of customers, whom it said it would contact directly as appropriate.[7]
What F5 said was not affected
F5 said it was not aware of any undisclosed critical or remote code vulnerabilities, or of active exploitation of any undisclosed F5 vulnerabilities.[8] It said it had no evidence of changes to its software supply chain, including its source code and build and release pipelines.[9] It also said it had no evidence that the attacker accessed or modified NGINX source code or its development environment.[10]
As of its filing, F5 said the incident had not had a material impact on its operations, and that it was still assessing the possible effect on its finances.[11]
Why disclosure was delayed
US public companies generally have to report a material cyber incident on Form 8-K within four business days of deciding it is material, but the filing may be delayed if the US Attorney General finds that immediate disclosure would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety.[12] F5 said the US Department of Justice made that determination on September 12, 2025, and it filed its report on October 15.[13] See cyber incident reporting rules explained.
CISA Emergency Directive 26-01
On October 15, 2025, CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-01. It said a nation-state affiliated cyber threat actor had compromised F5’s systems and taken files including part of its BIG-IP source code and vulnerability information.[4] CISA warned that this access could help the attacker find logical flaws and zero-day vulnerabilities and develop targeted exploits, and that the actor presented an imminent threat to federal networks using F5 devices and software.[5] It said successful exploitation could let an attacker reach embedded credentials and API keys, move laterally, steal data and keep persistent access.[14]
The directive ordered federal civilian agencies to inventory their F5 BIG-IP products and to apply the latest F5 updates to listed products by October 22, 2025. They also had to disconnect public-facing F5 devices that had reached end of support, and report to CISA by October 29, 2025.[6] For background, see zero-day vulnerabilities explained and CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Timeline
5 confirmed
confirmed
Deadline for agencies to report to CISA[6]
confirmed
Deadline for agencies to apply F5 updates[6]
confirmed
F5 discloses the breach; CISA issues Emergency Directive 26-01[3][4]
confirmed
Justice Department allows a delay in public disclosure[13]
confirmed
F5 learns a nation-state actor has accessed its systems[1][2]
Read next
CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog explained
What CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is, how a flaw gets listed, what federal agencies must do under BOD 26-04, and how others use it.
Questions readers ask
What was stolen in the F5 breach?
F5 said files taken by the attacker included portions of its BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities it was working on. Some files from its knowledge platform held configuration or implementation details for a small percentage of customers.[3][7]
Who was behind it?
F5 described a highly sophisticated nation-state threat actor, and CISA described a nation-state affiliated cyber threat actor. Neither named a country in these documents.[1][4]
Why did CISA issue an emergency directive?
CISA said access to the source code could help the attacker find flaws, including zero-day vulnerabilities, and build targeted exploits, and that the actor presented an imminent threat to federal networks using F5 devices.[5]
What did federal agencies have to do?
Inventory their F5 BIG-IP products, apply the latest F5 updates to listed products by October 22, 2025, disconnect public-facing F5 devices past end of support, and report to CISA by October 29, 2025.[6]
Was F5's software tampered with?
F5 said it had no evidence of changes to its software supply chain, including its source code and build and release pipelines, and no evidence the attacker accessed or modified NGINX source code.[9][10]
Why was the breach disclosed two months after F5 found it?
F5 said the US Justice Department decided on September 12, 2025 that delaying public disclosure was warranted under the SEC's Form 8-K rules.[13]
Sources
· 14 claims from 3 publishers
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.
- [1]
F5 told the SEC that on August 9, 2025 it learned a highly sophisticated nation-state threat actor had gained unauthorized access to certain company systems. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 · Item 1.05 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 · Item 1.05 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [2]
F5 said the attacker maintained long-term, persistent access to certain systems, including its BIG-IP product development environment and engineering knowledge management platform. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [3]
F5 said files taken by the attacker included portions of its BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities it was working on in BIG-IP. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [4]
On October 15, 2025, CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-01, saying a nation-state affiliated cyber threat actor had compromised F5's systems and exfiltrated files including part of its BIG-IP source code and vulnerability information. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 · Background (directive dated October 15, 2025) (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [5]
CISA said the source code access could help the attacker find logical flaws and zero-day vulnerabilities and develop targeted exploits, and that the actor presented an imminent threat to federal networks using F5 devices and software. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [6]
ED 26-01 required federal civilian agencies to inventory F5 BIG-IP products, apply the latest F5 updates to listed products by October 22, 2025, disconnect public-facing F5 devices that had reached end of support, and report to CISA by October 29, 2025. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [7]
F5 said some files taken from its knowledge management platform contained configuration or implementation information for a small percentage of customers, whom it would contact directly as appropriate. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [8]
F5 said it was not aware of any undisclosed critical or remote code vulnerabilities, or of active exploitation of any undisclosed F5 vulnerabilities. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [9]
F5 said it had no evidence of modification to its software supply chain, including its source code and build and release pipelines. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [10]
F5 said it had no evidence that the attacker accessed or modified the NGINX source code or product development environment. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [11]
As of its October 15, 2025 filing, F5 said the incident had not had a material impact on its operations and that it was evaluating the possible impact on its financial condition or results. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [12]
An Item 1.05 Form 8-K is generally due four business days after a company determines an incident is material, and may be delayed if the US Attorney General finds immediate disclosure would pose a substantial risk to national security or public safety. confirmedas of 2023-07-26
- SEC Adopts Rules on Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure by Public Companies · US Securities and Exchange Commission · Primary source · 2023-07-26 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [13]
F5 said the US Department of Justice determined on September 12, 2025 that a delay in public disclosure was warranted under Item 1.05(c) of Form 8-K; F5 filed its disclosure on October 15, 2025. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- F5, Inc. Form 8-K (Item 1.05, filed October 15, 2025) · F5, Inc. (SEC EDGAR) · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [14]
CISA said successful exploitation of the affected F5 products could let an attacker reach embedded credentials and API keys, move laterally, exfiltrate data and establish persistent access. confirmedas of 2026-11-14
- ED 26-01: Mitigate Vulnerabilities in F5 Devices · CISA · Primary source · 2025-10-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
Revision history (1)
- Page created.
Created Nov 14, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 15, 2026. Next scheduled review: Nov 14, 2027.
Cite this page
"The 2025 F5 source code breach and CISA Emergency Directive 26-01." ContentLora, updated Nov 14, 2026. https://contentlora.com/events/f5-breach-2025
Spotted an error? Suggest a correction or emailcorrections@contentlora.com.