Analysis
After New START: the debate over nuclear arms control
New START, the last treaty capping US and Russian strategic nuclear forces, expired on 5 February 2026.[1] Russia said it would keep to the old limits as long as the United States did, while Washington called for a new multilateral deal that includes China. China has refused to join.[2][3][4] US experts are split. Some say informal limits would buy time and slow a three-way arms race; others say they would tie US hands as China's arsenal grows.[5][6][7]
This analysis keeps sourced facts apart from interpretation. It attributes each government’s position to that government and each expert argument to the side that made it, as summarized by the Congressional Research Service. It covers events up to June 2026; any later talks are not included.
What happened
New START was signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. The two sides used its one-time option in 2021 to extend it to February 2026.[8] It capped each side at 700 deployed intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles and heavy bombers, 1,550 warheads on them, and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers.[9] Russia suspended its participation in 2023.[10]
In September 2025 President Putin proposed that both sides keep to the central limits informally for a year after expiry. Russia’s foreign ministry said in February 2026 that the United States had not formally replied.[11] The treaty expired on 5 February 2026. That left no treaty limits on the two largest arsenals for the first time in more than half a century.[1]
Where each government stands
- Russia: on 11 February 2026 Foreign Minister Lavrov said Russia would observe the limits as long as the United States did.[2] Some Russian officials have suggested that new US missile defenses could affect that.[12] See golden-dome-missile-defense.
- United States: officials said the treaty could not be extended again and that President Trump wants a better agreement covering all Russian nuclear weapons and China’s growing stockpile.[13] They proposed multilateral strategic stability talks including Russia and China.[3] New START did not cover Russia’s non-strategic (tactical) weapons. A senior US official called Russia’s numerical lead in them an intolerable disadvantage.[14]
- China: its ambassador for disarmament affairs said it would not join nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage, repeating that Russia and the United States should cut first.[4]
The US expert debate
CRS describes the core question as whether keeping the limits for a year would hamper US deterrence of China’s growing arsenal or help head off an arms race.[5]
- For keeping the limits: supporters argued it would give the United States time to decide how to answer China’s buildup without new Russian deployments. They said it could slow a three-way arms race, if only for a year.[6]
- Against: opponents argued it would stop the United States adding warheads to existing launchers and could make renewals expected, narrowing future options. The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission had said the United States should prepare to upload warheads.[7]
- Verification: since Russia suspended inspections, the United States has relied on satellites and other national technical means. Some experts questioned an offer that included no verification.[15]
- Scope: some argued that newer Russian systems such as the Kinzhal and Oreshnik missiles should be covered.[16]
In Congress, some members argued that arms control with Russia still has value and urged talks and mutual restraint. Others stressed Russian noncompliance and the need for US nuclear modernization.[17] The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2025 that operating and modernizing US nuclear forces could cost over $95 billion a year.[18]
The numbers behind the debate
SIPRI estimated 12,187 nuclear warheads worldwide in January 2026, with about 4,012 deployed.[19] Russia and the United States hold about 83% of stockpiled warheads. SIPRI said uncertainty about their future force levels was growing after New START, and that US deployments could rise if warheads are uploaded, launchers reactivated or non-strategic weapons added.[20] Both countries keep reserve warheads that could be loaded onto strategic launchers. A US official said in February 2026 that the United States retains non-deployed capacity it could use if the president directs.[21]
China’s arsenal is growing fastest. SIPRI estimates about 620 warheads and says that even at 1,000 by 2030, China would hold about a quarter of each of the current Russian and US stockpiles.[22] The wider regime is also under strain. The 2026 review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ended on 22 May without a final document, the third in a row.[23]
The two sides of the US debate share a premise: China’s growth changes what a US-Russian bargain is worth. They differ on whether a cheap, unverified freeze helps or hurts while Washington works out its answer. Russia’s offer and the US demand for a broader treaty point in different directions. Russia frames restraint as conditional on US behaviour, including missile defense. Washington wants a wider scope, covering tactical weapons and China, and Beijing has said it will not join negotiations at this stage. Without inspections, US monitoring of Russia’s forces rests on national technical means rather than shared data.
Forecast (uncertain): in the near term, informal restraint seems more likely than a new treaty, since the executive branch can make political commitments without Senate action.[24] Experts have proposed smaller risk-reduction steps, from data exchanges to pledges not to interfere with command systems or satellite monitoring, but Russia’s willingness to discuss them is uncertain.[25] Any US upload of warheads, or major missile-defense deployments, would be the clearest sign that the informal limits are ending.[20][12]
Related
Read arms control explained for the treaties themselves, then the pages on Golden Dome and SIPRI for missile defense and arsenal estimates.
Competing views
Keep the limits informally
Mutual restraint would give the United States time to decide how to answer China's buildup without facing new Russian deployments, and could slow a three-way arms race. Some members of Congress see continued value in arms control with Russia.[6][17]
Read next
Next in the crash course
Military spending by country: who spends the most on defence
World military spending reached an estimated $2,887 billion in 2025. The top spenders, shares of GDP, Europe's rise and how SIPRI and NATO measure it.
Questions readers ask
What was New START?
A 2010 US-Russia treaty, in force from 2011, that capped each side at 700 deployed missiles and heavy bombers, 1,550 warheads on them and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers. It was extended once, to February 2026.[8][9]
Are the US and Russia still keeping to the limits?
Russia said on 11 February 2026 that it would observe them as long as the United States did. The United States had not formally answered Putin's 2025 offer of a one-year informal extension.[2][11]
What does the United States want instead?
A better agreement that covers all Russian nuclear weapons, including tactical weapons outside New START, and China's growing stockpile, negotiated through multilateral talks.[13][3][14]
Will China join arms control talks?
China said in February 2026 that it would not join nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage, and that Russia and the United States should cut first.[4]
How big are the arsenals?
SIPRI estimates Russia and the United States hold about 83% of stockpiled warheads. It puts China at about 620 warheads, growing faster than any other country.[20][19][22]
Could an informal deal avoid the Senate?
Possibly. The Senate said in 2010 that further arms reductions should come through the treaty power, but CRS notes the executive branch can pursue nonbinding political commitments that may not need Senate action.[24]
Sources
· 25 claims from 8 publishers
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.
- [1]
New START expired on 5 February 2026, leaving no treaty limits on the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than half a century. confirmedas of 2026-02-11
- Russia says it will stick to New START's nuclear arms limits as long as U.S. does · Associated Press · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- U.S. Statement at the Conference on Disarmament · U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva · Primary source · 2026-02-06 · Hand-saved copy (curl, browser user agent); fetch-source failed (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [2]
On 11 February 2026 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the State Duma that Russia would observe New START's limits as long as the United States did. confirmedas of 2026-02-11
- Russia says it will stick to New START's nuclear arms limits as long as U.S. does · Associated Press · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [3]
After expiry, US officials called for multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability talks that include both Russia and China. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [4]
China's ambassador for disarmament affairs said on 6 February 2026 that China would not take part in nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage, repeating that Russia and the United States should cut their arsenals first; a foreign ministry spokesperson said China would not join the arms-reduction talks. confirmedas of 2026-02-11
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [5]
CRS describes the core of the US expert debate as whether a one-year extension of the limits with Russia would hamper deterrence of China's growing arsenal or help forestall an arms race. confirmedas of 2026-02-09
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [6]
Proponents argued an extension would give the United States more time to decide how to respond to China's buildup without new Russian deployments, and could slow a three-way arms race even if only for a year. confirmedas of 2026-02-09
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [7]
Opponents of extending the limits argued it would stop the United States from adding warheads to existing launchers and could make recurring renewals expected, narrowing future options; the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission said the United States should prepare to upload warheads. confirmedas of 2026-02-09
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [8]
New START was signed in 2010 and entered into force on 5 February 2011; the parties used its one-time option in 2021 to extend it by five years, to February 2026. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation · Primary source · 2026-02-04 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [9]
New START's central limits were 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; 1,550 warheads on those deployed systems; and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers. The State Department said both sides met them by February 2018. confirmedas of 2026-11-07
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- New START Treaty · U.S. Department of State · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to New START's nuclear arms limits as long as U.S. does · Associated Press · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [10]
Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023; Russia's foreign ministry calls it a response to US steps, and AP and Al Jazeera report that Moscow said it remained committed to the treaty's numerical caps. confirmedas of 2026-02-11
- Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation · Primary source · 2026-02-04 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation · Primary source · 2026-02-04 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to New START's nuclear arms limits as long as U.S. does · Associated Press · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to New START's nuclear arms limits as long as U.S. does · Associated Press · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [11]
In September 2025 President Putin proposed that Russia and the United States keep observing New START central limits informally for one year after expiry; Russian officials said the United States never formally responded. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the expiration of the Russia-US New START Treaty · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation · Primary source · 2026-02-04 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [12]
Some Russian officials have suggested that new US missile defense developments may affect whether Russia keeps to the treaty limits. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [13]
At the Conference on Disarmament on 6 February 2026 the United States said the treaty could not legally be extended again, that President Trump wants a better agreement, and called for a new architecture covering all Russian nuclear weapons and China's growing stockpile. confirmedas of 2026-02-06
- U.S. Statement at the Conference on Disarmament · U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva · Primary source · 2026-02-06 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- U.S. Statement at the Conference on Disarmament · U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva · Primary source · 2026-02-06 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- Russia says it will stick to limits of expired nuclear treaty if US does · Al Jazeera · Secondary source · 2026-02-11 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [14]
New START did not cover all Russian nuclear weapons, notably non-strategic (tactical) weapons, and in February 2026 a senior US official called Russia's numerical lead in tactical weapons an intolerable disadvantage. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S. Statement at the Conference on Disarmament · U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva · Primary source · 2026-02-06 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [15]
Since Russia suspended inspections in 2023 the United States has relied on national technical means such as satellites to monitor Russia's forces, and some experts questioned an offer that included no verification. confirmedas of 2026-02-09
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [16]
Some experts said newer Russian systems such as the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile should be considered in any extension of limits. confirmedas of 2026-02-09
- Extension of New START Central Limits: Overview of the Expert Debate (IN12640) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-09 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [17]
In Congress, some members argued arms control with Russia has continued value and urged talks and mutual observance of the limits, while others stressed Russian noncompliance and US nuclear modernization. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [18]
The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2025 that operating and modernizing US nuclear forces could cost over $95 billion a year. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [19]
SIPRI estimated a global inventory of 12,187 nuclear warheads in January 2026, of which about 9,745 were in military stockpiles and about 4,012 were deployed; it estimated China had about 620 warheads. confirmedas of 2026-06-08
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [20]
SIPRI said in June 2026 that uncertainty about US and Russian strategic force levels was growing after New START expired, that Russia and the United States hold about 83% of stockpiled warheads, and that US deployments could rise through uploading warheads, reactivating launchers and adding non-strategic weapons. confirmedas of 2026-06-08
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [21]
Both countries hold reserve warheads that could be loaded onto strategic delivery vehicles, and in February 2026 a US official said the United States retains non-deployed nuclear capacity that could be used if the president directs. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- New START Expires As U.S. Urges 'Modernized' Treaty · Arms Control Association · Secondary source · 2026-03-01 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S. Statement at the Conference on Disarmament · U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva · Primary source · 2026-02-06 (retrieved 2026-11-07)
- [22]
SIPRI estimates China is expanding its arsenal faster than any other country, but says that even if it passes 1,000 warheads by 2030 it would hold about a quarter of each of the current Russian and US stockpiles. confirmedas of 2026-06-08
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [23]
The 2026 NPT Review Conference ended on 22 May 2026 without a final outcome document, the third in a row to do so. confirmedas of 2026-06-08
- Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: new SIPRI Yearbook out now · Stockholm International Peace Research Institute · Primary source · 2026-06-08 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [24]
The Senate said in 2010 that further arms reduction agreements may be made only through the treaty power, but the executive branch may also pursue nonbinding political commitments that may not need Senate action. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [25]
Without arms control, some experts propose risk-reduction steps ranging from data exchanges to political commitments not to interfere with nuclear command systems or satellite monitoring; Russia's willingness to discuss them is uncertain. confirmedas of 2026-02-26
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress (IF12964) · Congressional Research Service · Primary source · 2026-02-26 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
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Created Nov 14, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 14, 2026. Next scheduled review: Feb 5, 2027.
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"After New START: the debate over nuclear arms control." ContentLora, updated Nov 14, 2026. https://contentlora.com/analysis/new-start-and-nuclear-arms-control-debate
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